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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3291
___________
J.P.S., a/k/a S.J.P.,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A99-473-409)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 17, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 22, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
J.P.S., a Colombian citizen, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision affirming the denial of his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”).1 For the following reasons, we will grant the petition for review.
I.
J.P.S. entered the United States in August 2006 and was immediately taken into
custody. An asylum officer determined that he had a credible fear of persecution and
released him on bond to pursue his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the CAT.
At his removal proceedings, J.P.S. claimed that he had been persecuted due to his
homosexuality by the Colombian police and Fuezas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (“FARC”).2 He testified that, in 2004, drug dealers associated with FARC
moved into his Medellin neighborhood, and that after identifying him as a homosexual,
they verbally harassed and threw stones at him. In early 2005, J.P.S.’s brother, Ruben,
informed the Medellin police that FARC had infiltrated the neighborhood and that its
members were dealing drugs. J.P.S. testified that Ruben informed on FARC in an effort
to stop them from harassing him. FARC members instead shot Ruben to death. Two
weeks later, J.P.S.’s second brother, Luis, drunkenly confronted FARC members

1

J.P.S. has not challenged, before the BIA or this Court, the Immigration
Judge’s denial of his CAT claim.
2

“FARC is a leftist guerilla organization that originally was established to
serve as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party.” Tapiero de Orejuela v.
Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2005). Where FARC exercises control, it “in
effect displaces civil government. Even where FARC does not fully displace the civilian
government, it nevertheless operates without [sic] impunity as a result of a reign of terror.
. . .” Id.
2

regarding the murder of Ruben and their harassment of J.P.S. FARC members responded
by killing Luis. After Luis’s murder, FARC members began threatening J.P.S. by stating,
“faggot, faggot, what happened to your brother is going to happen to you,” and that they
were going to “put a stick in [his] behind.”
Meanwhile, in early 2005, after gathering in a public park known for tolerance of
homosexuality, J.P.S. and several friends were taken into police custody. J.P.S. testified
that he was held at the police station for approximately twelve hours and was verbally
abused for being gay—the police stated that they “didn’t want to see the faggots” and that
they “had to clean their neighborhoods.” The police also threw cold water on him and
forced him to sit in wet clothes. Before he was released, he was told that if he or his
friends spoke out about what had happened, they were the ones who “were going to
suffer.”
In December 2005, J.P.S. moved to Bogota because the situation in Medellin was
“becoming unbearable.” He chose Bogota because a friend in the same profession was
able to find work there. J.P.S. testified that although Bogota was more progressive than
Medellin, it was not without anti-gay bias and violence. He recounted one instance in
which a friend was killed after leaving a disco with a young man. He also asserted that he
was forced to run into discos to avoid confrontations with anti-gay groups.
After spending one month in Bogota, J.P.S. returned to Medellin to help care for
his mother. In Medellin, the “aggressions” by FARC “intensified.” They told him that if
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he did not want to end up like his brothers, he must either pay a weekly quota or deal
drugs for them. If he complied with their demands, they would allow him to “be gay and
in peace.” When J.P.S. ignored their demands, FARC members began physically
assaulting him. From April to August 2006, J.P.S. was assaulted eight-to-ten times while
at the bus stop, walking to and from his house, and in front of his house. The most
serious incident occurred at the door to his house when FARC members hit him, kicked
him in the stomach, and scraped his hand with a razor. Soon after he was attacked at the
bus stop, J.P.S. left for the United States.
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied J.P.S.’s requests for relief, concluding that
the incidents he described did not rise to the level of persecution and that evidence of
current country conditions undermined his claimed fear of future persecution. The BIA
affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed J.P.S.’s appeal. Although the IJ did not
specifically make such a finding, the BIA assumed that J.P.S. was mistreated on account
of the protected ground of his sexual orientation, but agreed that J.P.S.’s experiences were
not sufficiently severe to constitute past persecution. The BIA also concluded that the IJ
did not err in finding that J.P.S. failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
persecution.
J.P.S., through counsel, now petitions for review of the BIA’s final order of
removal.

4

II.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(1). We review the BIA’s decision for substantial evidence, considering whether
it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” Balasubramanrim v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation and citation omitted).3 The decision must be affirmed “unless the
evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Zubeda v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir.
2001)).
An applicant for asylum has the burden of establishing that he is unable or
unwilling to return to his home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Persecution “connotes extreme
behavior, including threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so
severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214,
217 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Here, the BIA agreed that the IJ properly denied J.P.S.’s claims because his

3

J.P.S. incorrectly asserts that the BIA substantially adopted and affirmed the
decision of the IJ and that we should thus review the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See
Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). Because the BIA did not defer to the
IJ’s findings or adopt the IJ’s opinion, we review the BIA’s decision only. See Abdulai v.
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 545, 549 (3d Cir. 2001).
5

experiences did not rise to the level of persecution. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530,
536 (3d Cir. 2005).4 The BIA relied, in large part, on the lack of severity of J.P.S.’s
injuries. Concentrating solely on the lack of severe physical harm, however, minimized
the nature of the situation and ignored much of the evidence supporting J.P.S.’s claim.
See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring the BIA to
demonstrate that it has “reviewed the record and grasped the movant’s claims). For
example, the BIA did not acknowledge that the people who physically and verbally
assaulted J.P.S. had murdered two of his brothers. While J.P.S. conceded that Ruben was
killed because he reported FARC’s drug dealing to the police, he testified that Luis was
killed at least in part because he tried to defend him. Regardless of why J.P.S.’s brothers
were killed, their murders made FARC’s subsequent targeting of J.P.S. particularly
foreboding. Thus, when viewed in a wider context, FARC’s constant threats and repeated
physical attacks on J.P.S.—even if they did not result in life-threatening injuries—may
rise to the level of persecution. See De Santamaria v. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1009
(11th Cir. 2008); cf. Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that
isolated incidents that do not result in serious injury do not rise to the level of
persecution). The BIA’s failure to acknowledge significant aspects of J.P.S.’s claim
renders us unable to adequately to consider whether substantial evidence supports its

4

Because the BIA made no explicit finding as to J.P.S.’s credibility, we
proceed as if his testimony were credible. Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 235 (3d
Cir. 2003).
6

determination that J.P.S. failed to establish past persecution. See Chavarria v. Gonzales,
446 F.3d 508, 517-18 (3d Cir. 2006) (remanding after determining that the BIA’s
mischaracterization and understatement of the evidence established that its decision was
not supported by substantial evidence); Chen v. I.N.S., 359 F.3d 121, 127-28 (2d Cir.
2004); Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 178.5
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the BIA did not adequately consider
J.P.S.’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. We therefore cannot accept
its determination that he failed to establish past persecution.6 Accordingly, we will grant
J.P.S.’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s decision, and remand the case for further
proceedings.

5

We do, however, conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
decision that J.P.S.’s detention by the Colombian police, in and of itself, does not rise to
the level of persecution. See Kibinda v. Att’y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2007).
6

Because we have determined that the BIA’s decision regarding past
persecution is not supported by substantial evidence, we do not consider its determination
as to J.P.S.’s fear of future persecution.
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